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Abstract
We analyze the sustainability of collusion in a supergames framework wherein the only input is a highly qualified type
of labor, with its supply being upward-sloping and the wage being sensitive to the industry input demand. Hence, when
seeking to expand production, firms have to attract additional employees by offering them higher wages. We compare
equilibria and social welfare in both quantity and price competitions, as well as by considering non-negligible firing
costs. We prove that: the sensitivity of wages to the industry demand for labor facilitates collusion in price competition
(in quantity competition, the reverse is true); in both price and quantity competitions, collusion should be welfare-
enhancing when the sensitivity of wage is high enough. Moreover, the introduction of firing costs, decreasing the
incentive to cut the production after a temporary rise, reduces the deviation profits making collusion easier to sustain.
Our results can be extended to any context where input prices are endogenous.
The authors wish to acknowledge the editor and one anonymous referee for their contribution, as well as the participants and discussants at the
following conferences where a previous version of this paper was presented: JEI 2018 and SIEPI 2018. We would also like to show our
gratitude to A. Scognamiglio and G. Valletta for their comments. Any errors are our own.
Citation: Carlo Capuano and Iacopo Grassi, (2019) ''Upward-sloping labor supply, firing costs and collusion'', Economics Bulletin, Volume
39, Issue 1, pages 502-512
Contact: Carlo Capuano - carlo.capuano@unina.it, Iacopo Grassi - iagrassi@unina.it.
Submitted: December 05, 2018.   Published: March 16, 2019.
 
   
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the economics literature has thoroughly investigated
the tacit collusion inherent in oligopolistic markets using the repeated framework
proposed by Friedman (1971). Yet, only a few prior studies have analyzed the
e¤ect of the input pricing on the collusion sustainability in the output market,
with the majority of them having focused on models of oligopsony and assumed
some degree of buyer power in the wage-bargaining determination.1
In the present study, using the model set proposed by Capuano and Grassi
(2018), we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a supergames framework
wherein the only input is a highly qualied type of labor, with its supply being
upward sloping and the wage being sensitive to the industry input demand (i.e.,
the industry output supply). Hence, when seeking to expand production, rms
have to attract additional employees by o¤ering them higher wages. When
focusing on the sustainability of collusion, it can be seen that the sensitivity
of the equilibrium wage to the industry demand for labor a¤ects the incentives
to both deviate and punish, modifying the critical discount factor. We extend
the analysis by comparing equilibria and social welfare in both Cournot and
Bertrand competition, as well as by considering non-negligible ring costs. We
prove that the sensitivity of wages to the industry demand for labor facilitates
collusion in Bertrand competition, while such sensitivity might render collusion
non-sustainable in Cournot competition. Moreover, the introduction of ring
costs reduces rms incentive to decrease their output levels (i.e., to re some
employees). Within this framework, starting from the collusive outcome, a
cheater rm increases its level of output during the deviation phase (hiring
additional employees), while it decreases its level of output (ring employees)
when the punishment phase begins. Further, to punish the cheater, the cheated
rms increase their levels of output as reply to deviation. Thus, the presence
of ring costs a¤ects only the cheaters prot, thereby reducing the marginal
protability of any additional output during the deviation phase and decreasing
the unilateral incentive to deviate, both in quantity and price competitions.
A key novelty of our model lies in the price-maker role played by oligopolistic
rms in the input market. Typically, in a partial equilibrium model, rms are
price-takers with respect to the input prices, and their strategic decisions do
not a¤ect them. According to the general equilibrium approach, even though
the input prices depend on rms decisions, rms play a price-taker role in the
input market. In our model, rms act as price-makers in both the input and
output markets, and the input prices belong to the rms strategic sets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the model and the results presented by Capuano and Grassi (2018). In Section
3, we analyze the price competition, comparing the results with the quantity
competition case. Then, in Section 4, we extend our analysis by considering
ring costs, while in Section 5, we exploit the welfare impact of collusion. Fi-
nally, we present our conclusions in Section 6. The proofs of the lemma and the
1See, inter alia, Van Gompel (1995), Majumdar and Saha (1998), Bertomeu (2007), Vlassis
and Varvataki (2014), and Capuano and Grassi (2018).
1
propositions are available in the Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The model setting
Consider the model set proposed in Section 2 of Capuano and Grassi (2018):
a market where two symmetric rms produce a homogenous good, with linear
demand function P = 1  q1   q2, where q1 and q2 are the rms outputs, P is
the output price.
The labor li; with i = 1; 2, is the only production input and, following Horn
and Wolinsky (1988), technology displays constant return to scale: input li
produces output qi = q(li) = li of good i: Thus, if the input price is wage (w),
the cost function is Ci = wqi.
The labor demand curve (Dl) is given by the sum of rms conditioned input
demands, l1(q1) and l2(q2): The labor supply curve, Sl is linear and increasing
in w.
Dl = l1(q1) + l2(q2) = q1 + q2 (1)
Sl : wS = w0 + bSl (2)
with w0; b  0. The elasticity of the supply curves decreases with respect to b;
when b = 0 the supply curve is innitely elastic. Thus, assuming w0 = 0; we
have the equilibrium wage w on the labor market such that Dl = Sl:
w = b(q1 + q2) (3)
We consider the case where rms contract their employees period by period,
and, in this section, we exclude ring costs.2 The rm is prot function is:
i = (1  qi   qj)qi   b(qi + qj)qi (4)
with i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. @Ci=@qj = bqi > 0 is the negative externality of the rm
js output on the rm is prot. In other words, the output of rm j increases
the wage in the labor market, and thus the total cost of rm i. Therefore, any
increase in a rms output causes a twofold increase in its production costs.
The input demand increases, and the wage increases as well. Thus, when a rm
increases its production, the higher the sensitivity of the equilibrium wage to
the industry demand of labor, the higher the increase in the total cost. When
rms collude in the output market, they reduce their level of production and,
as a consequence, the industry input demand. In other words, the equilibrium
wage reects the production decisions of the rms.
Following Friedman (1971), let Nash, Coll, and d be respectively the
one-shot payo¤s in the Nash equilibrium, in case of collusion, and in case of
deviation from collusion, where d  Coll  Nash. In order to sustain
collusion, the following incentive compatible constraint must be satised:
2This implies that in any period li = qi:
2
Coll
1    
d +

1  
Nash (5)
i   = 
d  Coll
d  Nash (6)
where i is the individual discount factor of rm i, measuring the weight of
future prots, and  is the critical discount factor. The higher the value of ,
the more di¢cult the sustainability of collusion.
2.2 The quantity competition
In this section we recall Capuano and Grassi (2018), where we analyzed the
quantity competition case. The Cournot prots (labeled by CN ), the collusive
one (labeled by Coll), and the cheaters prot in the deviation (labeled by d)
phase are:
CN1 = 
CN
2 =
1
9(1 + b)
(7)
Coll1 = 
Coll
2 =
1
8(1 + b)
(8)
d1 =
 
20b+ 12b2 + 9

64 (b+ 1)
3 (9)
Substituting equations (7), (8), and (9) in condition (6), we obtain the crit-
ical discount factor CN :
CN =
d1  Coll1
d1  CN1
= 9
(2b+ 1)
2
52b+ 44b2 + 17
(10)
No rm has unilateral incentives to deviate only if 1; 2  CN . Moreover,
the higher is the slope of the labor supply, the harder is collusion to sustain, i.e.
the discount factor is increasing in b: @
CN
@b > 0. In order to punish deviation,
cheated rm has to increase its production. This requires to hire additional
employees at a higher wage, increasing rms cost, and thus reducing punishment
protability.
Denoting by  d2 the cheated rm prot during the deviation phase, and by
CN2 its prot during the punishment phase, to punish deviation is protable if
and only if CN2   d2 ; this condition requires b  2:9271 = b. We summarize
these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Collusion is sustainable as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
if and only if:
- both rms are su¢ciently patient, i.e. 1; 2  CN ;
- punishing any deviation is credible, i.e. b  b:
3
Notice that, in the extreme case where b = 0 we obtain the standard Cournot
critical discount factor; i.e., CN (b = 0) = 9=17:
3 The price competition
In this section we extend the analysis to price competition assuming that: (i)
when rms collude, they x the monopolistic price and share the market; (ii)
in the deviation phase, the cheater xes a price lower than the collusive one,
serving all the market demand; and (iii) after any deviation, both rms play the
Bertrand Nash reversion.
Given that rms exhibit strictly decreasing return to scale, we cannot ap-
ply the marginal-cost pricing rules to derive the pure strategy Bertrand Nash
equilibrium (labeled by BN ).3 However, in a n-rm homogeneous product mar-
ket with convex costs, Dastidar (1995) characterizes a set of Bertrand Nash
equilibria satisfying the following properties:
(i) all rms charge the same price;
(ii) for no rm is undercutting protable;
(iii) no rm gets negative prots.
When rms are symmetric the equilibrium is not unique; we look for the
most severe punishment; i.e., the zero-prot one.
Lemma 1 The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is a price vector (pBN1 ; p
BN
2 ) =
( bb+1 ;
b
b+1 ) such that: (i) rms prots are zero (i.e., 1(p
BN
1 ; p
BN
2 ) = 2(p
BN
1 ;
pBN2 ) = 0); (ii) there does not exist any alternative price p
0 < pBN1 such that
1(p
0; pBN2 ) > 1(p
BN
1 ; p
BN
2 ) or 2(p
BN
1 ; p
0) > 2(p
BN
1 ; p
BN
2 ).
We assume that colluding rms maximize their joint prots Coll1 +
Coll
2 with
respect to p.
Coll1 +
Coll
2 = p(1  p)  b(1  p)2 (11)
From the First Order Condition, we obtain:
pColl =
1 + 2b
2 + 2b
; qColl1 = q
Coll
2 =
1
4 (b+ 1)
; wColl =
b
2 (b+ 1)
(12)
Coll1 = 
Coll
2 =
1
8 (b+ 1)
(13)
In the deviation phase, the cheater xes the deviation price pd that undercuts
the competitor and makes protable to serve all the market demand. The
deviation prot is:
d = (1  pd)pd   wColl  qColl   wd  (1  pd)  qColl (14)
3See Vives (2001), Chapter 5.
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where wd = b
 
(1  pd) + qColl. Maximizing (14) with respect to pd, under the
condition pd < pColl,we obtain:
pd =
1 + 2b
2b+ 2
   = pColl with ! 0 (15)
The cheater o¤ers a price innitesimally lower than the collusive one, ob-
taining a deviation prot tending to the monopolistic one:
d =
1
4 (b+ 1)
  b

1
4 (b+ 1)
2
(16)
Note that d   Coll is positive for any b  0; i.e., the unilateral deviation
is always protable.
In the deviation phase, the cheated rm xes the collusive price pColl and
does not sell any unit of the good. Hence, due to the production costs already
incurred, its prot is negative during the deviation phase, while it increases to
zero in the punishment phase. This means that the cheated rm nds always
protable starting the Bertrand Nash reversion. From equations (13),(14) and
Lemma 1, we obtain:
Proposition 2 Collusion is sustainable as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
if and only if both rms are su¢ciently patient, i.e. 1; 2  BN = b+23b+4 :
We remark that the higher is the slope of the labor supply, the easier is collu-
sion to sustain; i.e., the discount factor is decreasing in b (@
BN
@b =   2(3b+4) < 0).
The comparison between the critical discount factors BN and CN conrms
that collusion is easier to sustain under Bertrand than under Cournot competi-
tion. Indeed, in quantity competition, deviating the cheater produces additional
quantity, and the cheated rm continues producing and selling the collusive out-
put. The latter obtains minor, but positive, prots. However, punishing reduces
cheateds prot and may not be protable. On the contrary, in price competi-
tion, the cheater undercuts the rival and cleans the market. The cheated rm
has a negative prot (i.e., it produces but does not sell). Hence, in this case, the
cheated rm has always a positive incentive to punish, since punishing increases
its prot to zero. In other words, in a tighter input market the sustainability of
collusion increases (decreases) under price (quantity) competition.
Furthermore, the impact of b on the critical discount factors BN and CN
is di¤erent. In quantity competition, the critical discount factor is increasing
in b: when b is higher than the threshold value b, the critical discount factor
is a¤ected by a discontinuity jump, reaching its maximum value (CN = 1) for
any b > b. This means that, when the equilibrium wage is sensitive enough
to the labor demand, collusion is never sustainable. On the contrary, in price
competition, b negatively a¤ects the critical discount factor; i.e., an increase in
the rigidity of the labour supply plays a pro-collusive role.
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This interesting result depends, in general, on the di¤erent nature of the
two competitions,4 in particular, on the di¤erent magnitude of the e¤ect of
the parameter b on the deviation prots. Consider the incentive compatible
constraint described in equation 5. Since collusive prots are the same in both
the competitions, the trend of  depends only on the impact of b on the deviation
and Nash prots. In Bertrand competition quantity deviation is higher (since
the cheater rm undercuts the rival); thus, the impact of b on deviation prot is
higher; at the same time, the Nash prots are una¤ected by b (BN = 0), thus
the second term of the constraint 5 is more sensitive to b in Bertrand than in
Cournot, and the slope of  changes sign.
Figure 1 illustrates the critical discount factors in quantity and price com-
petitions as a function of b.
4 Firing costs
In this section, we assume that: (i) rms contract employees for t > 1 periods;
(ii) rms have to compensate an employee with a money transfer f > 0 (lump
sum), when the latter is red.5
In this framework, there is only one case where a rm reduces production, i.e.
when the cheater reduces its output in the punishment phase. Indeed, deviating
from collusion, the cheater increases its production (hiring new employees);
when punishment starts it has to decrease it (ring employees), and ring costs
negatively a¤ect its prot. On the contrary, the cheated rm increases its output
after a deviation; hence, ring costs do not a¤ect the protability of starting
the punishment phase. The impact of ring cost is described by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Firing costs reduce unilateral incentives to deviate in quantity
and price competitions.
Proposition 3 states that ring costs unambiguously reduce the marginal
prot during the deviation phase, and the cheaters prot during the punishment
phase. As a consequence, the critical discount factor is decreasing with respect
to f (@
CN
@f < 0 and
@BN
@f < 0). This means that ring costs are a pro-collusive
factor.
5 Social welfare and collusion
Collusion typically causes allocative ine¢ciency in the market, since rms jointly
reduce their outputs. In our model, a lower level of the industry output is
4 In the case of Cournot competition goods are strategical substitutes, in the case of
Bertrand competition prices are strategical complements.
5Notice that in a seminal contribution Dixit (1980) shows that increasing production re-
quires always investment in capacity; i.e., additional costs. In our model, additional costs
occur only when the increase in production is temporary, followed by a reduction in the Nash
reversion phase.
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associated with lower levels of labor demand and wage, decreasing the industry
costs; i.e., the marginal cost is lower when rms collude. In other words, there
exists a trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ciency and cost reduction. We prove that,
when the sensitivity of wage to the input demand is high enough, collusion may
enhance welfare.
The social welfare in the good market, measured as the sum of consumers
surplus and prots, in the cases of quantity competition, price competition, and
collusion are:
WCN =
(2qCN )2
2
+ 2CN =
2
9
b+ 2
(b+ 1)2
(17)
WBN =
(2qBN )2
2
+ 2BN =
1
2(b+ 1)2
(18)
WColl =
(2qColl)2
2
+ 2Coll =
1
8
2b+ 3
(b+ 1)2
(19)
The comparison of equations (17), (18), and (19), leads us to the following
propositions:
Proposition 4 In the case of quantity competition, collusion is welfare enhanc-
ing when b 2 [5=2; b].
Proposition 5 In the case of price competition, collusion is welfare enhancing
when b  1=2.
Both in quantity and price competitions, increasing the level of output causes
an increase in the marginal cost. When the slope of the input supply is high
enough collusion, reducing industry total costs, enhances social welfare; in other
words, the reduction in total costs more than compensate the allocative inef-
ciency. In price competition, collusion can be sustainable at any level of b,
when rms are su¢ciently patient. Then, for values of b high enough, collusion
is sustainable and welfare enhancing. On the contrary, in quantity competition,
an increase of b has two opposite e¤ects: on the one hand, increasing b the
di¤erence between collusive and non-cooperative welfare increases (in favor of
collusive equilibrium); on the other hand, increasing b the punishment is not
credible and collusion is not sustainable. Thus, only for intermediate values of
b; collusion is sustainable and welfare enhancing.
Notice that the results on welfare crucially depend on the increasing marginal
costs, due to the assumption that wages rise in output.6
6 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that, in the presence of an oligopsony or in the
case of monopsonistic competition in the labor market, rms try to coordinate
6Similarly, in the well-known contribution by De Fraja and Delbono (1989), the increasing
marginal cost assumption causes an increase in welfare when total output decreases, and it
is a critical argument for privatization.
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themselves in terms of setting wages and reducing their production costs.7 How-
ever, although rms do not collude in the labor market, the wage sensitivity to
the output supply a¤ects rms protability with regard to their ability to ex-
pand their levels of production, and it also plays a crucial role in the collusion
sustainability in the output market.
In this paper, we have analyzed rms incentive to collude when the labor
supply curve is upward sloping and when expanding production requires the
o¤ering of higher wages. In the collusive scheme, both deviation and punish-
ment require an increase in production. When increasing production proves too
costly, deviation from collusion may not be protable. Moreover, collusion sus-
tainability requires the cheated rm to punish the cheater rm as a reply to any
deviation; thus, punishing may be not protable. In this case, the net impact
of the sensitivity of the supply function with respect to wages on the critical
discount factor is ambiguous. We have proved that, in the case of quantity
competition, the greater the extent to which wages are sensitive to the industry
demand for labor, the harder it is to sustain collusion. In the case of price
competition, the opposite is true.
Furthermore, we have shown that ring costs are univocally pro-collusive,
reducing the rms incentives to decrease its level of production and rendering
deviation less protable (in both quantity and price competitions).
Finally, analyzing social welfare, we have proved that, in both price and
quantity competitions, collusion can be socially preferable to a non-cooperative
outcome.
Extensions of our analysis may exploit the role of ring cost in rms versus
unions bargaining processes.
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Figure 1: The critical discount factors in quantity competion (above) and price
competition (below).
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
See Capuano and Grassi (2018).
Proof of Lemma 1:
i) Assume pi = pj = p: Symmetric duopolistic prots are equal to zero if
and only if: p = bb+1 = p
BN : i(p; p) = p
(1 p)
2   b(1   p) (1 p)2 = 0, where
pColl   pBN = 12+2b > 0.
ii) There exists an unilaterally-protable deviation if and only if p0 < pBN :
Thus, if p1 = p
BN , and p2 = p
0, we have 2(p
BN ; p0) = (1   p0)p0   b(1  
pBN ) (1 p
BN )
2  b

(1 pBN )
2 + (1  p0)

(1  p0)  (1 pBN )2

. Then, 8p0  1+2b2+2b 
1
2
p
(b+1)3
; 2(p
BN ; p0)  2(pBN ; pBN ).
However, 8b > 0; p0   pBN = 12

(b+ 1)
 1   (b+ 1) 3=2

> 0:
Proof of Proposition 2:
Substituting equations (13), (14) and the Bertrand prots in condition (6),
we obtain the critical discount factor BN =
d
1
 Coll
1
d
1
 BN
1
= b+23b+4 , where 8b 2 R+;
BN < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3:
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In quantity competition, Ed = d(qd; qColl) + 

 f(qd   qCN ) + CN1 

.
The optimal deviation output is such that qd = argmaxqE
d : @
d(qd;qColl)
@qd
 
f = 0. Since d(qd; qColl) is concave with respect to qd, then @q
d
@f < 0.
Moreover, since qd(f = 0) 6= qd(f > 0), then d(f > 0) < d(f = 0) and
Ed(f > 0)) < Ed(f = 0). The same argument can be applied to price
competition.
Proof of Proposition 4:
WColl  WCN = 18 2b+3(b+1)2   29 b+2(b+1)2 = 172 2b 5(b+1)2  0 if and only if b  52 .
However, by Proposition 1, collusion is sustainable only if b  2:9271 = b. As
b > 5=2, when b 2 [5=2; b] collusion is sustainable and WColl  WCN > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5:
WColl  WBN = 18 2b+3(b+1)2   12(b+1)2 = 18 2b 1(b+1)2  0 if and only if b  12 .
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